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The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA")' is federal legislation which contains specific, uniform
provisions that govern all aspects of pesticide registration, pack-
aging and labeling. FIFRA's express statutory language prohibits
states from continuing or imposing requirements for labeling or
packaging that are different from, or in addition to, those required
under FIFRA.2 The doctrine of federal preemption 3 arguably pre-
cludes common law tort claims. Furthermore, this prohibition fa-
vors pesticide manufacturers joined as defendants in personal in-
jury or property damage litigation based on failure to warn or
improper labeling claims.
Since FIFRA's revision in 1972, a number of state and federal
courts have addressed the issue of whether state common law tort
claims are preempted by FIFRA. The majority view holds that
claims based on inadequate labeling are preempted by FIFRA.4
* Judi Abbott Curry is a partner at Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer in New York, specializ-
ing in complex mass tort litigation. B.A., State University of New York at Stony Brook,
1983; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1986.
** Cynthia Weiss Antonucci is a partner at Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, specializing in
toxic torts, sick building syndrome and multiple chemical sensitivities litigation. B.S.N.,
State University of New York at Plattsburg, 1978; J.D., New York Law School, 1983.
*** Eric A. Portuguese is a former judicial law clerk with the Appellate Division, Second
Department. Presently, he is a partner at Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer specializing in
state and federal appeals. B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1977; J.D., Albany Law
School, 1980. The authors wish to express their appreciation to the efforts of Catherine
Feehan in publishing this article.
1 Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994)).
2 Id. § 136v(b).
3 State v. McHorse, 517 P.2d 75, 79 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (discussing policy of federal
preemption).
4 See Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 72 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding ex-
press warranty claim preempted); Taylor AG Industries v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 561-63
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding implied warranty, negligent testing and failure to warn claims
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The minority view, having its genesis in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia's Ferebee v. Chevron Chem-
ical Co.,' has been adopted by a number of federal district courts
throughout the country.6
The Supreme Court's preemption analysis in the controversial
cigarette labeling case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,7 has
tipped the balance of this "split in circuits" toward preemption.
The issue of preemption, as it relates to FIFRA, seems destined for
Supreme Court review. It is expected that the Supreme Court will
set forth a holding that common law tort claims for personal in-
jury and property damage based on inadequate labeling and fail-
ure to warn of the dangers of pesticides are preempted by FIFRA.
This article examines the statutory language, legislative history,
regulatory scheme and judicial interpretations of FIFRA, all of
which support preemption.
preempted); King v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding FIFRA preempts state tort claims of inadequate labeling), cert. dismissed, 114 S.
Ct. 490 (1993); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993); Worm v.
American Cyanamid, Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1303 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd on remand, 5 F.3d 744
(4th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Part. v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158,
158 (10th Cir.), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), on remand, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), on remand sub
noma. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub noa. Papas v. Zoecon
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (per curiam); Begley v. Truly Nolan Exterminating, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1038, 1039
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992); Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 936 (Nev. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1944 (1993). Contra Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1532 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Ark.
1992).
6 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
6 Id. at 1542. Ferebee holds that FIFRA does not either expressly or impliedly preempt
state common law tort claims based on failure to warn. Id. The court's perspective has been
adopted by certain federal district courts considering the issue. See MacDonald v. Mon-
santo Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that FIFRA preempts state
statutory labeling claims, not failure to warn claims), rev'd, 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994);
Couture v. Dow Chem. Co., 804 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D. Mont. 1992) (discussing that states
are free to regulate use of pesticides through common law remedies); Thorton v. Fondren
Green Apts., 788 F. Supp. 928, 932 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F.
Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (D. Mont. 1991), aff'd on other grounds, 993 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1993); Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-06 (W.D. Mo.
1991); Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990);
Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co.,
702 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ.
762, 1988 WL 52779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1988).
7 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
I. THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT
FIFRA exclusively preempts state authority to regulate pesti-
cide labeling and packaging.' The Act represents a comprehensive
federal system for the strict regulation of pesticides. FIFRA was
enacted in 1947 to supplant and expand the protection provided
by its predecessor statute, the Insecticide Act of 1910,1 the first
federal act regulating the pesticide industry. 10 In 1972, increasing
environmental and safety concerns motivated Congress to under-
take a thorough revision of FIFRA. The 1972 amendments
strengthened FIFRA's legislation and labeling standards signifi-
cantly. " The two main goals of the 1972 revisions were to monitor
the use of pesticides to protect man and the environment, and to
extend federal pesticide regulation to intrastate actions.
12
The 1972 revisions transferred responsibility for the regulation
of pesticides from the Department of Agriculture to the newly
formed Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). '3 The adminis-
trator of the EPA is directed to register a pesticide if he or she
determines that the pesticide will perform without causing unrea-
sonably adverse effects on man's health or the environment.' 4 A
pesticide registered with the EPA must include EPA-approved
warnings that aim to protect health and the environment on its
labels.' 5 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit emphasized in Arkansas-Platte and Gulf Partnership v. Van
Waters & Rogers, Inc.,16 the EPA considers all adverse effects
caused by a pesticide when it determines whether labels comply
with FIFRA's requirements.' 7 The labels must protect the public
8 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a)-(b) (1994). The relevant provisions provide that "[a] State may regu-
late the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if
and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this sub-
chapter." Id. Furthermore, the Uniformity provision provides that "[sitates shall not im-
pose or continue in effect any requirements for labelling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under this subchapter." Id.
9 See H.R. REP. No. 313, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1200, 1200.
10 See S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993,
3999.
11 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994); see also Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 601 (1991).
12 See S. REP. No. 838, supra note 10.
13 Id. at 4001.
14 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C) (1994).
15 See Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
16 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993).
17 Id. at 161-62.
1995]
328 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:325
from fraud and personal injury as well as serve to prevent unrea-
sonable adverse effects on the environment.' 8
A. Legislative History of FIFRA
Under FIFRA, the EPA maintains authority over the registra-
tion of pesticides and the approval of labels. FIFRA and its legis-
lative history demonstrate an absolute congressional intent for
the EPA to have exclusive control over the regulation of pesticide
labeling.' 9
Congress intended that FIFRA's preemptive reach extend to
any labeling requirement promulgated by a state.20 The issue that
arises is whether FIFRA's preemptive effect is limited to legisla-
tively enacted laws and regulations, or whether FIFRA also pre-
cludes state common law tort claims. Both FIFRA and its legisla-
tive history broadly discuss preemption as applying to any
labeling requirements that are different from those prescribed by
FIFRA, not simply requirements that are legislatively enacted. 2 '
The authority to promulgate such regulations was reserved exclu-
sively for the EPA.22
B. Comprehensive Federal Regulation of Pesticide Labeling
The EPA has regulated practically every facet of pesticide label-
ing.23 In order to register, FIFRA requires that each applicant file
with the EPA a complete description of the tests conducted on the
pesticides and their results.24 Furthermore, FIFRA's regulations
dictate the specific scientific tests that must be performed to test
18 See id.
19 See Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 805.
20 S. REP. No. 838, supra note 10, at 4021.
21 H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972). In a report accompanying the House
bill, state power to regulate labeling was regarded by the House Committee as completely
preempted. Id. "In dividing the responsibility between the [s]tates and the [flederal
[glovernment for the management of an effective pesticide program, the Committee had
adopted language which is intended to completely preempt State authority in regard to
labelling and packaging." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4092, 4128.
22 See Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 804-05.
23 See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), vacated
sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), on remand sub nom. Papas v.
Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S.
Ct. 300 (1993).
24 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F) (1994). This section requires a full description of tests
made and the results when requested by the EPA. Id.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
each category of pesticides.2 5 This test data includes extensive in-
formation relating to a pesticide's product chemistry, residue
chemistry, toxicity levels, as well as the effects of exposure to
humans, wildlife and aquatic organisms and plant life.2 6 Addition-
ally, FIFRA regulations prescribe strict laboratory practice stan-
dards that must be satisfied when conducting tests or studies re-
lating to an application for pesticide registration. 27
FIFRA is equally stringent with regard to labeling. The EPA
specifies, among other things, the particular warning language as
well as the placement and type-size of the warning.2 The EPA
also requires that a statement of practical treatment, for example,
first aid or other treatment appear on the label for each pesti-
cide.29 Extensive warnings and precautionary statements about
risks to humans also are required by FIFRA and its regulations. 30
The EPA also requires that if a danger to humans or domestic ani-
mals exists, precautionary statements must indicate: (1) the spe-
cific hazard; (2) the routes of exposure; and (3) the precautions
that should be taken to avoid accident, injury or property
damage.31
The EPA requires that pesticide labels contain directions for
use, stated in clear terms which easily can be read and under-
stood.32 A pesticide is considered misbranded under FIFRA's regu-
lations if it does not include a warning or caution statement which
may be necessary to protect health.
Additionally, FIFRA is equipped with a special review and a re-
registration processes. Once a pesticide has been registered and
its label approved, the pesticide and its label remain subject to
EPA scrutiny through the special review33 and the re-registration
processes.34 FIFRA provides that if after registration, additional
factual information arises regarding unreasonable adverse effects,
25 See 40 C.F.R. § 158 (1994).
26 See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1994).
27 See 40 C.F.R. § 160 (1994).
28 See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1994).
29 See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(1)(iii) (1994).
30 See Table at 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(hXl) (1994). Pesticides are grouped into four human
toxicity categories: oral, inhalation, dermal toxicity and contact with the eyes or skin. Id.
The warning on the label is based on the pesticide's toxicity category. Id.
31 See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(2)(iXA) (1994).
32 See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(i)(1)(i) (1994).
33 See 40 C.F.R. § 154 (1994).
34 See 40 C.F.R. § 152 (1994).
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the registrant must provide such new information to the
administrator.3 5
Moreover, a manufacturer may not alter or revise cautions or
precautionary statements listed on a warning label without EPA
approval.3 6 Generally, with respect to label alterations and revi-
sions, the manufacturer is required to submit to the EPA an appli-
cation for an amended registration supported by extensive scien-
tific test data.3 v The result of which is that a pesticide label cannot
contain language which the EPA has not approved. The EPA's au-
thority over pesticide labeling may be construed as an independ-
ent preemptive source by virtue of this comprehensive regulatory
scheme.
II. THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The Supremacy Clause 8 of the United States Constitution per-
mits Congress to preempt state law in several different ways. For
example, Congress may expressly displace state law. The ques-
tion in express preemption analysis is whether Congress has pro-
vided for preemption in express terms. 39
Another type of preemption is implied preemption. One form of
implied preemption asks whether congressional intent to preempt
state law in a particular field may be inferred where the scheme of
federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive.4 ° Federal law
also impliedly preempts state law when the federal law conflicts
with state law4 ' and such conflict makes it impossible to comply
with federal and state regulations concurrently.42 Lastly, state
law is impliedly preempted when it obstructs the purposes and
goals of Congress.43
35 See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (1994).
36 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(1) (1994).
37 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 152.44, 152.50, 158 (1994).
38 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the
United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
39 See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
40 See id. at 280-81; see also Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300
(1988) (finding that issue of preemption requires study of congressional intent which can be
inferred by examining extent to which federal statute dominates field).
41 See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281; see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 491 (1987).
42 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
43 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v.
Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981).
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A. The Seminal Opinion Of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Company
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
first considered whether state common law actions based on fail-
ure to warn claims were preempted by FIFRA in 1984, in Ferebee
v. Chevron Chemical Co.44 The court in Ferebee permitted a state
jury to find a product inadequately labeled despite the EPA's de-
termination that, under FIFRA, the label was adequate.45 The
court decided that FIFRA did not preempt state common law tort
remedies, making the distinction between FIFRA as a regulatory
measure and compensatory state tort remedies.46 The court rea-
soned that its decision to allow a state cause of action is not neces-
sarily regulatory, and the defendant Chevron can comply with
both federal and state law by continuing to use the EPA-approved
label and simultaneously paying damages to successful tort plain-
tiffs, such as Mr. Ferebee.47
Aside from this regulatory-compensatory distinction, the court,
in Ferebee, acknowledged that FIFRA does not permit states to
impose additional labeling requirements.48 The court also noted
that the legislature did not expressly preempt state damage ac-
tions, but it simply precluded states from directly ordering
changes in the EPA-approved labels.49 The Ferebee court's ration-
ale, known as the "choice of reaction" analysis, has been specifi-
cally rejected by most courts, and implicitly rejected by a plurality
of the Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.5"
At present, the Ferebee decision, holding that FIFRA neither ex-
pressly nor impliedly preempts state common law tort claims
based on failure to warn, remains the minority perspective. 5 1 Sub-
44 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
45 See id. at 1540.
46 See id. at 1541.
47 See id.
48 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541.
49 Id. at 1542.
50 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
51 See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (E.D. Tex. 1993); Couture v.
Dow Chem. Co., 804 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (D. Mont. 1992); Thorton v. Fondren Green Apart-
ments, 788 F. Supp. 928, 929 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F.
Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (D. Mont. 1991), aff'd on other grounds, 993 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1993); Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1501 (W.D. Mo. 1991);
Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Stew-
art v. Ortho Consumer Prod., No. 87-4252, 1990 WL 36129, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1990);
Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co.,
702 F. Supp. 195, 196 (N.D. Il. 1988); see also Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ.
1995]
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sequent to Ferebee, the climate of FIFRA preemption was chilled.
The Ferebee court had squarely held that state common law tort
claims based on inadequate pesticide labeling were valid rights of
recovery. Consequently, manufacturers could either change their
label, refrain from selling their products in the states where such
actions predominate or pay the judgment.
Beginning in 1987, several district courts revisited the Ferebee
rule. In Fitzgerald v. Mallinkrodt,52 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected Ferebee, hold-
ing that allowing recovery for claims under state law, despite Con-
gress' intent to provide uniform regulations governing the labeling
of pesticides, would allow plaintiffs to use a back door to gain
recovery.53
In Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit analyzed whether the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act 55 (the "Cigarette Labeling
Act") preempted failure to warn claims.5" In evaluating and re-
jecting the "choice of reaction" concept, the court in Palmer recog-
nized that effecting such a change in the manufacturer's behavior
and imposing such additional warning requirements through the
imposition of liability is exactly what Congress sought to preempt
by creating the Cigarette Labeling Act. In effect, this holding
grants a single jury the regulatory power explicitly denied to the
states.58
Fitzgerald and subsequent decisions rejected the "choice of reac-
tion" analysis, which in essence is a business choice between pay-
ing damages and changing the label, as illusory. 9 While Ferebee
762 1988 WL 52779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1988); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970
F.2d 1301, 1303 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd on remand, 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993).
52 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
53 See id. at 407.
54 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
55 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282, [hereinafter Cigarette Labeling Act] (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
56 Palmer, 825 F.2d at 620.
57 See id.
58 Id. at 627-28.
59 See Fitzgerald v. Mallinkrodt, 681 F. Supp. 404, 406-07 (E.D. Mich. 1987). See, e.g.,
Worm v. American Cyanamid, Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1301 (4th Cir. 1992), affd on remand, 5
F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Part. v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959
F.2d 158, 162 (10th Cir.), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), on remand, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 (1lth Cir.
1991) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), on
remand sub nom. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (lth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 559
[Vol. 10:325
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continues to have a steady, minority following, its precedential
value has been undercut by numerous state6 0 and federal 61 deci-
sions finding express or implied preemption of tort claims.
(E.D. Miss. 1990); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 805-06 (M.D. Fla. 1989);
Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1288-89 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Davidson v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 931 (Nev. 1992).
60 Courts in seventeen of eighteen states considering this issue have found preemption.
See Davidson, 834 P.2d at 931; see also Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So. 2d 131, 131
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Begley v. Truly Nolan Exterminating, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1038, 1039
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Stilties v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 343 S.E.2d 715, 931 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 347 S.E.2d 568 (Ga. 1986); Abelman v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., Civ. No. 12611, 1991 WL 213402, at *2 (Md. Cir. Ct., May 17, 1991); Yowell v. Chev-
ron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Hopkins v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 432
S.E.2d 142, 145 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Contra Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136,
144-45 (Ark. 1992).
See generally Ramos v. Gollins, No. C750551 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Cty., Feb. 21,
1992); Macias v. State, No. BC024-501 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles Cty., Jan. 29, 1992);
White v. Cal-X-Pest Control, No. 51296, (Cal. Super. Court, Sacramento Cty., Oct. 28,
1991); Bolduc v. Chemed Corp., No. 43-94-55 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Cty., Apr. 10, 1989);
Lopez v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 89272 (Cal. Super. Ct. Ventura Cty., Oct. 25, 1988); Bond
v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 89-CV 133 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Delta Cty., Oct. 30, 1991); South Colo.
Farms, Inc. v. Green, No. 88 CV 40 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Saguache Cty., June 7, 1991); Op-
permann v. Stevens, No. 88 CV 1192 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cty., June 1, 1990); Perry v.
Dow Chem. Co., Case No. CL-88-10227-AN, (Fla. Cir. Ct., Palm Beach Cty., June 5, 1991);
Moyer v. Dow Chem., No. CI89-8657 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Orange Cty., May 8, 1991); Plott v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 86-17740-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Deval Cty., Oct. 27, 1989); Rogers v.
Thumb Pest Control, Inc., No. 88-3462 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Hillborough Cty., Oct. 10, 1989); Day
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 12950-7-80 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Cassia Cty., Sept. 10, 1985); Fullmer
v. Arab Termite and Pest Control, Inc., No. 29C 018907 CT415 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Hamilton Cty.,
May 24, 1991); Bander v. Southern States Coop., Inc., No. 92-CA-19196 (Md. Cir. Ct. How-
ard Cty., Dec. 31, 1992); Dubois v. Ray's Feed Mill, Inc., No. 88-9140-NZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Delta Cty., Jan. 26, 1990); Tessman Seed & Chem. Co. v. Minnesota, No. C8-89349 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Ramsey Cty., July 9, 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 467 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991); Merrill v. Dow Chem. Co., No. P188-2630 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., May
1, 1990); Wixson v. Sonford Products Corp., No. 24847 (Miss. Chancery Ct. Rankin Cty.,
May 1, 1989); Paul v. NCH Corp., No. 48262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Niagara Cty., Dec. 11, 1989);
Tilton v. Dow Chem. Co., Civ. Div. GD 88-02950, No. 137710 (Pa. C.P. Ct., Alleghany Cty.,
Apr. 4, 1990); Maberry v. Tomlin, No. 141-104135-87 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Tarrant Cty., June 1,
1992); Leonard v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., No. 236-10567-87 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Tarrant Cty.,
May 26, 1992); Mechura Farms v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 30, 144-S (Tex. Dist. Ct., Wharton
Cty., May 5, 1992); Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 88-2-04556-4 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Pierce Cty.,
Oct. 25, 1991); Selvig v. Lentz Fertilizer Inc., No. 85 CV456 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dunn Cty., Dec.
26, 1988).
61 King v. E.I. du Pont DeNemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1347 (1st Cir. 1993); Shaw v.
Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte, 959 F.2d at 158;
Worm, 970 F.2d at 1301, 1303; Papas, 926 F.2d at 1019; Kolich v. Sysco Corp., 825 F. Supp.
959, 961 (D. Kan. 1993); Burge v. Jones, Civ. No. B-92-022, 1992 WL 415263, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 18, 1992); Casper v. E.I. du Pont DeNemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903, 907 (E.D.
Wash. 1992); Gibson v. Dow Chem. Co., 842 F. Supp. 938, 940 (E.D. Ky. 1992); Jordan v.
Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 805 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 (S.D. Ga. 1992); Burke v. Dow
Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Young v. Amererican Cyanamid Co.,
786 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D. Ark. 1991); Herr v. Carolina Log Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958,
960 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Miss. 1990);
Fisher, 716 F. Supp. at 1283; Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 812; Watson v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., Inc., No. Civ. JFM-88-2427, 1988 WL 235673, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 1988); Fitzgerald,
681 F. Supp. at 404.
334 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
B. Express Preemption of Failure To Warn Claims
Congress' comprehensive legislation bars states from interfer-
ing with regulation of pesticide labels, which are solely within the
province of EPA. 2 The issue that remains, however, is whether a
state court jury verdict assessing liability based on a failure to
warn claim constitutes the regulation of pesticide labels. 63 It is
asserted that Congress expressly intended to preempt state label-
ing requirements as well as state common law tort actions based
on failure to warn in the 1972 amendments to FIFRA a
Proponents of the majority view assert that the broad language
of FIFRA that prohibits "any requirements" by states prohibits ju-
ries from assessing liability based on the adequacy of a label.65
This interpretation of FIFRA's express preemptive reach conforms
with both a plain reading of section 136v of FIFRA, as well as the
United States Supreme Court's consideration of tort preemption
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.66
In Cipollone, the Court considered the preemptive effect of the
Cigarette Labeling Act.67 The Supreme Court's ruling in Cipollone
mandates that state tort actions are preempted as a matter of
law.6
8
The Supreme Court held that the Cigarette Labeling Act's pre-
emption of state law requirements and prohibitions included the
preemption of common law rules, even though this preemption
was not expressly stated in the provision.6 9 The Court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that Congress did not intend to bar common
62 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
63 See Arkansas-Platte, 981 F.2d at 179; Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 806-07.
64 See King, 996 F.2d at 1348-49; see also Shaw, 994 F.2d at 370-71; Arkansas-Platte,
981 F.2d at 1179; Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n., Inc. v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 945 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 80 (1992); Levesque v. Miles Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61, 69 (D.N.H.
1993); Casper, 806 F. Supp. at 906-907; Gibson, 842 F. Supp. at 940; Burke, 797 F. Supp. at
1139-41; Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 812; Herr, 771 F. Supp. at 961; Watson, No. Civ. JFM-88-
2427, 1988 WL 235673, at *2-3; Fitzgerald, 681 F. Supp. at 407.
65 See King, 996 F.2d at 1348-49; Shaw, 994 F.2d at 370-71; Papas, 985 F.2d at 519;
Arkansas-Platte, 981 F.2d at 1179; Casper, 806 F. Supp. at 906-907; Herr, 771 F. Supp. at
961.
66 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
67 Id. at 508. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994). The 1969 version of the preemption clause
provides that "[o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act." Id. § 1334(b).
68 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525-26. Accord King, 996 F.2d at 1349; Shaw, 994 F.2d at
370-71; Papas, 985 F.2d at 518-19;Arkansas-Platte, 981 F.2d at 1179; Casper, 806 F. Supp.
at 906-07; Burke 797 F. Supp. at 1140.
69 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31, 523 n.22 (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 10:325
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
law actions, reasoning that the plaintiff's position contradicts
both the plain words of the 1969 Act and an accepted understand-
ing of common law damages actions.7v
In light of Cipollone, courts must focus on the meaning of "any
requirement" under FIFRA. 71 As such, the inquiry is whether the
legal duty of labeling or packaging, on which the action for com-
mon law damages is based, supplants the FIFRA requirements.7 2
Several federal courts have applied Cipollone's definition of "re-
quirement" to FIFRA's statutory language prohibiting require-
ments for labeling. 73 The United States Court of Appeals for both
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits recently revisited the issue of
FIFRA's preemption of labeling claims.74 On remand from the
Supreme Court, both circuits adhered to their original decisions
that FIFRA bars labeling claims on the basis of express preemp-
tion.75 Upon examination of the purpose underlying FIFRA's regu-
lation of labeling and a state common law duty to warn, the Tenth
Circuit, in Arkansas-Platte v. Van Waters,76 found plaintiff's tort
claim to be an impermissible requirement for labeling. 77 The
Tenth Circuit used Cipollone's preemption analysis to buttress its
prior holding, determining that the labeling provision of FIFRA is
as inclusive as the labeling provision contained in the Cigarette
Labeling Act, which the Court held preempted state common law
labeling and duty to warn claims.78 Similarly, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in Papas v. Upjohn Co.,79 held, in light of Cipollone, that
70 See id. at 522. Writing for a plurality, Justice Stevens explained that "common law
damages are based on the existence of a legal duty" and that "it is the essence of the com-
mon law to enforce duties that are either affirmative requirements or negative prohibi-
tions." Id.
71 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
72 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522; Casper 806 F. Supp. at 907.
73 See supra notes 19-22.
74 Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Part. v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1177 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 516 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993).
75 See Warner v. American Fluoride Corp., 204 A.D.2d 1, 1, 616 N.Y.S.2d 534, 534 (2d
Dep't 1994).
76 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993).
77 Arkansas-Platte, 981 F.2d at 1179. The court stated that "[the objectives of the com-
mon law duty and a regulatory statute are the same. Both address a manufacturer's duty
to convey information about a product through the medium of a label." Id. Furthermore,
the court found it necessary to hold that the common law duty to warn is subjected to the
same federal preemptive constraints as a state statute. Id.
78 See id.
79 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S, Ct. 300
(1993).
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FIFRA expressly preempts claims to the extent they are based on
inadequate labeling or packaging.80
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit found that the plaintiff's position that common law
tort actions were not preempted "evaporated" last summer when
the Supreme Court decided Cipollone.8 ' The court held that
sweeping congressional efforts to preempt state regulation also
bar state damages claims.8"
On July 7, 1993, the First Circuit became the fourth circuit
court to embrace the impact of Cipollone on FIFRA preemption.8
Following Cipollone, the First Circuit, in King v. E.I. DuPont
deNemours & Co.,84 held that FIFRA preempts state law tort
claims based on defendants' alleged failure to provide adequate
warnings about the health hazards associated with the use of her-
bicides that they manufactured and sold.8 5 The court noted that
the Ferebee court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's
subsequent Cipollone analysis and ruling.86
Congress defined FIFRA's preemptive effect using broad termi-
nology prohibiting labeling "requirements" that differ from those
required by FIFRA. If the Supreme Court finds that common law
claims concerning cigarette labeling must impose "requirements,"
then common law claims concerning pesticide labeling must also
impose "requirements" and are, therefore, expressly preempted.
FIFRA's contemplation of state authority expressly prohibits
states from regulating label content. Such regulation necessarily
includes jury verdicts based on failure to warn claims. Therefore,
the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone supports the view of ex-
press preemption.
80 Papas, 985 F.2d at 517.
81 Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1993).
82 Id. The court stated that a "broad statement in a federal law prohibiting state regula-
tion does, in fact, wipe away, common law attempts to impose liability on top of the federal
regulation." Id.
83 See King v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st Cir. 1993).
84 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1351.
87 See supra notes 66-86 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Cipollone preemp-
tion decision on issue of FIFRA preemption).
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C. FIFRA Impliedly Preempts Failure To Warn Claims
The Supreme Court held, in the context of cigarette labeling,
that where Congress has considered the issue of preemption by
including in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly address-
ing the issue, there is no need to infer congressional intent for pre-
emption."8 This broad rule may be construed as abrogating all
prior FIFRA preemption law, thus challenging the analysis of a
strong body of case law which developed prior to Cipollone, hold-
ing that FIFRA impliedly preempts common law tort claims.
Applying traditional principles of preemption, courts agree that
FIFRA impliedly preempts state court failure to warn claims.8 9 In
Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 9° the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that to the extent that
state law places a duty to provide a warning that is different from,
or in addition to, FIFRA labeling standards, it is preempted. 91
In Papas v. Upjohn Co. ,92 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit noted FIFRA's direction toward preemption
and explained that states should not impose or maintain require-
ments for labeling beyond those imposed by FIFRA.93 Thus, hesi-
tant to bar the plaintiff's claims based on express preemption, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that FIFRA impliedly preempts state
common law tort actions based on labeling claims in several
ways.94 After considering FIFRA's express prohibition of state la-
beling requirements and examining regulations adopted under
88 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517; see also, Freightliner Corp. v. Murick, 115 S. Ct. 1483
(1995) (holding express preemption clause does not entirely foreclose any possibility of im-
plied preemption).
89 See Worm v. American Cyanamid, Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1303 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd on
remand, 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), on
remand sub non. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); Begley v. Truly Nolan Exterminating, Inc.,
573 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d
62, 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 936 (Nev. 1992)
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993); Little v. Dow Chem. Co., Inc., 148 Misc. 2d 11, 12, 559
N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1990).
90 970 F.2d 1301 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd on remand, 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993).
91 Id. at 1303; see also Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Miss. 1990)
(holding that FIFRA preempted state failure to warn claim); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
716 F. Supp. 1283, 1288-89 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding FIFRA preempted state common law
claim for failure to adequately warn); Young v. American Cyanamid Co., 786 F. Supp. 781,
783 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
92 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991).
93 Id. at 1023-24.
94 See Papas, 926 F.2d at 1021.
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FIFRA, the court held that the federal government has occupied
the field of labeling regulation, leaving no room for states to sup-
plement federal law, even by means of state common law tort
actions.
95
Furthermore, the Papas court held that jury awards would re-
sult in direct conflict with federal law.96 A state common law tort
judgment that a pesticide's labeling is inadequate directly con-
flicts with the EPA's determination that the labeling is adequate
to protect against health risks.97 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
found that allowing state common law tort suits for inadequate
labeling would defeat the goal of uniformity for pesticide
labeling.98
Upon the remand of Arkansas-Platte and Papas, the Supreme
Court, through Cipollone, found express rather than implied pre-
emption.99 Thus, analysis of a statute's express preemptive reach
should be the first order of inquiry in a preemption analysis.
FIFRA's preemptive effect on state common law labeling claims
is discussed by the Supreme Court's opinion concerning the local
regulation of pesticides in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mor-
tier.100 In Mortier, the Supreme Court held that FIFRA did not
preempt the regulation of pesticides by local or municipal govern-
ments. 10 1 The Court held that nowhere does FIFRA expressly sup-
plant local regulation of pesticide use.1 0 2 Silence in this respect is
not enough to mandate the preemption of local authority. 10 3
The Mortier Court further rejected the contention that FIFRA
occupied the entire field of pesticide regulation, stating that cer-
tain provisions leave specific portions of the field to state regula-
tion and much smaller portions to local regulation. 0 4 Moreover,
the Court stated that local permit regulations, as distinguished
95 See id. at 1024.
96 Id. at 1025.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1024-25; see also Jordan v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 805 F. Supp. 1575,
1578 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (holding FIFRA preempted state tort law claims based on negligent
labeling).
99 See Papas, 985 F.2d at 518; Arkansas-Platte, 981 F.2d at 1179.
100 501 U.S. 587 (1991).
101 Id. at 606.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 Id. at 612-14.
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from labeling or certification,10 5 are not within the area that
FIFRA's program preempts. 10 6
Based along these lines, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, in Jordan v. Southern Wood Pied-
mont Co.,' 0 7 recognized that Mortier sets forth that FIFRA does
not absolutely preempt all fields related to pesticides. 10 8 The Mor-
tier Court recognized, however that FIFRA provides narrow pre-
emptive coverage of certain areas, such as labeling.
III. THE FEREBEE DECISION AND ITS PROGENY HAVE
BEEN OVERRULED
The many cases that reject the Ferebee analysis do so in the con-
text of implied preemption. 10 9 Ferebee's conclusion, that the impo-
sition of failure to warn liability leaves pesticide manufacturers
free to choose either not to sell the product in the state or to pay
for liabilities resulting from sales, is not a realistic economic
choice." 0 The Ferebee court dismissed claims of implied preemp-
tion by rejecting the notion that state common law tort claims con-
stitute a true obstacle to and conflict with state and federal law.
More importantly, however, Ferebee merely glossed over express
preemption analysis.
In Cipollone, the Court recognized that regulation of a particu-
lar activity can be effectively exerted in the form of an award of
damages. The obligation to pay damages can act, and is designed
to act, as a means of influencing behavior and controlling
policy.111
105 Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Part. v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 163 (10th
Cir. 1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), on remand, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); see also Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir.
1993) (stating FIFRA does not preempt generalized state regulation of pesticides).
106 Mortier, 501 U.S. at 615.
107 805 F. Supp. 1575 (S.D. Ga. 1992).
108 See id. at 1583.
109 See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1139 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Papas
v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Papas v.
Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), on remand sub nom. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d
516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993)); see also
Arkansas-Plate, 959 F.2d at 164.
110 Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 937 (Nev. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1944 (1993).
111 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Counsel v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1959); Palmer
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 628 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating award of damages arro-
gates to single jury regulatory power denied to states).
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The Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of the Ferebee
analysis of regulatory-compensatory impact in International Pa-
per v. Ouellette."2 The Court, in its determination that Vermont
common law nuisance actions were preempted by the Clean Water
Act, 3 noted that the inevitable result of such state suits would be
that states could regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources
indirectly. 1 14
The Supreme Court implicitly rejected Ferebee's premise that
jury verdicts do not constitute regulation in Cipollone v. Lig-
gett.1 5 A plurality of the Court found that the 1969 Cigarette La-
beling Act, barring states from imposing any requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking or health concerns in cigarette package
labeling sweeps broadly."16
CONCLUSION
State common law tort actions do regulate pesticide labels. As
even the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
agrees, FIFRA expressly preempts state regulation of pesticide la-
beling. Ferebee's rejection of FIFRA preemption is invalid in light
of Cipollone.
Over the last decade, more than fifty courts considering the is-
sue of FIFRA preemption concur that common law tort claims are
preempted. These courts, however, have had difficulty coming to
grips with the precise basis for FIFRA preemption of plaintiffs'
claims. Preemption has been found on both express and implied
grounds. The express language and purpose of FIFRA strongly
supports a defendant manufacturers' contention that the statute
preempts plaintiffs' failure to warn claims. The so-called minority
view, promulgated by the decision in Ferebee and its progeny,
should be rejected because the reasoning, the "choice of reaction"
analysis, has been rejected specifically by many courts and implic-
itly overruled by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme
112 479 U.S 481 (1987).
113 Pub. No. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
114 See Ferebee, 479 U.S. at 495-97.
115 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
116 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520; see also Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 518 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993) (stating common
law damages awards are form of state regulation and requirements within meaning of
FIFRA).
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Court's recent expression of federal preemption concepts in Cipol-
lone, and post-Cipollone case law, are supportive of a defendant
manufacturers' assertion that FIFRA expressly preempts common
law tort claims based on inadequate labeling of pesticide products.

